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INTRODUCTION

Free exercise claimants don't tend to assert that their religious motives give them a
prerogative to harm others; they instead argue that the exemptions they seek are
harmless.2 This highlights an important constitutional principle: exemptions for religious
believers may not impose substantial harms on third parties.3 As a result of this principle,
the Supreme Court has regularly rejected exemptions that would transfer the burdens of
religious compliance from objectors to other third parties.
So what counts as harm? Of late, this question arises as employers refuse coverage for
contraception to employees,5 wedding vendors deny service to same-sex couples,' and
social service providers are given license to discriminate against unwed couples and
pregnant women for religious reasons.' A number of prominent scholars argue that no
harm accrues to third parties from exempting these objectors.' In these commercial
settings, the no-harm argument boils down to a claim that refusing to provide goods,

2

See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, A Common-LawModelfor Regious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV.

1465, 1520 (1999).
3 See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
ContraceptionMandate: An UnconstitutionalAccommodation of Relgion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 343 (2014) (setting out the doctrinal basis of this principle).
4 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (underscoring that "courts must take adequate
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on non-beneficiaries"); Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-11 (1985) (invalidating law mandating time off for religious
Sabbath observers in part because it burdened their coworkers); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261
(1982) ("Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the
employer's religious faith on the employees."); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
84-85 (1977) (construing Title VII to require religious accommodation only where substantial costs are
not imposed on owner or coworkers); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) ("[R]ecognition of
the appellant's right to unemployment benefits under the state statute [does not] serve to abridge any
other person's religious liberties."); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (expressing concern
over the prospect of employer exemptions from Sunday closing rules due to the impact on employees' time
for family and relaxation). But see Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of

Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30, 338-39 (1987) (holding application of Title VII's
religious organization exemption to religious organization's secular nonprofit activities did not violate
Establishment Clause).

See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (extending religious
accommodation from contraceptive requirements to for-profit employers).
6 See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted sub
nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (granting cert
petition in case of a same-sex couple denied service by a bakery).
7 Barber

v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 723-24 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (enjoining Mississippi statute

allowing discrimination against LGBT and unmarried persons by persons holding religious beliefs against
sex outside of opposite-sex marriage), rev'don standinggrounds, 860 F.3d 345, 358 (5th Cir. 2017).
s See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Volokh Conspiracy Prof MichaelMcConnell (Stanford) on the
Hobby
Lobby
Arguments,
WASH.
POST.
(Mar.
27,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/27/prof-michael-mcconnellstanford-on-the-hobby-lobby-arguments/ [https://perma.cc/PR5A-88UG] (arguing that, where regulation
redistributes from business to employees, government does not have a compelling interest in protecting those
employees' new "statutory right").
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services, or employee benefits inflicts no harm because no one has a right to be sold
another's goods, to enter into an employment contract, or to rent another's property.'
This libertarian baseline is often implicitly, but sometimes explicitly, defined by tort,
contract, and property law.' 0 On this account, "direct invasions of another's life, liberty,
or property-the historic framework of criminal or tortious acts" count as third-party
harms," but removal of modern-day statutory rights may not rise to the level of harm. 2
Proponents of this common law baseline argue that, as defined by statute and regulation,
third-party harms are indeterminate and in danger of ever-expanding. 3 Dignitary
damages face particular scorn as evidence of an overreaching state.' 4 Moreover, these
scholars say, using a statute to set the baseline for free exercise analysis is partial, resorting
to values over principles."
In stark contrast, the pre-regulatory or common lawbaseline is seen to leave all parties
alone, preserving freedom without burdening anyone. From this perspective, exemption
6
from legislation or regulation reverts to a neutral moment before the government acted.'

9 See Volokh, supranote 2, at 1520,1526 (summarizing this argument).
10
See
Thomas
C.
Berg,
Religious Exemptions
and

Third-Party Harms,
17
FEDERALIST
SoC'Y
REV.,
Oct.
2016,
at
50,
51,
https://fedsoc-cmspublic. s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/8uSzajiVVNYvaUrlClx2vBWdmNrC2ITDGEetth3i.pdf
[https://perma.cc/548F-DDQ8] ("The contraception mandate is a prime example of modern government
declaring a legal entitlement unknown to the common law .... ); Nathan B. Oman, Doux Commerce,
Religion, and the Limits ofAntidiscriminationLaw, 92 IND. LJ. 693, 717 (2017) (arguing that, in the
absence of market-wide access problems, "[t]he refusal of any particular individual to contract with
another individual is a natural result of freedom of contract and should not be made a legal wrong.").
For a pure libertarian take, see Richard A. Epstein, Religious Libertyin the Welfarc State, 31 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 375, 377-79, 407 (1990) (arguing that "all tensions" between religion and the state
arise from the post-1937 acceptance of state regulation of contract and employment, i.e., not from the
unregulated common law).
11 Berg, supra note 10, at 53.
12 See id at 58; Michael W. McConnell, 14hyProtectReligious Freedom?, 123 YALE LJ. 770, 807
(2013) ("[V]ery few free exercise claims seek authorization to invade the private rights of third parties or
to inflict harm (in the Millian sense) upon them. Most, instead, resist the blanket enforcement of
regulatory schemes that interfere with natural liberty .... ).
13 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Do DiscretionaryReligious Exemptions Violate the Establishment
Clause?, 106 KY. LJ. 601, 625 (2018) ("The [c]oncept of '[t]hird-[p]arty [h]arm' [i]s [u]ndefined and
[i]mpossibly [e]xpansive."); McConnell, supra note 12, at 804 ("[T]he idea of 'harm,' or of 'burdenshifting,'
is
not
self-defining.... Unfortunately, neither courts nor scholars have given serious analytical attention to what
counts as 'harm."').
14 See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
15 See Esbeck, supra note 13, at 659 (arguing that scholarly supporters of the no-harm doctrine
"would reset the baseline to fit their politics. For example, because they favor the Affordable Care
Act ('ACA') as a matter of social policy, they make the effective date of this new statutory entitlement
the baseline . . . ").
16 Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 17, Zubik v.

Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, & 15-191)
("A religious exemption in [RFRA's] name simply 'lifts' the burden imposed on religious employers by
the Affordable Care Act, returning both the religious employer and its employees to neutral.");
McConnell, supranote 12, at 805 ("From the baseline of the regulatory requirement imposed on everyone,
an exemption for one individual can be said to 'harm' the intended beneficiaries of the law, because they
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Sometimes this claim takes the form of a state action doctrine that contrasts
regulation with the government's purported inaction." I previously have argued
that this regulation-free baseline is artificial because law has always structured the market
and, even in the absence of statute, has never been neutral as to subsidies and burdens.
In this symposium Article, I contend that the "pre-regulatory" baseline suffers
from an additional difficulty through its reliance on common law. The common law
is not set or fixed, but constantly evolving over time and across jurisdictions." Much
more so than statutes or regulations, the common law proves indeterminate. I offer
two examples implicated in religious liberty debates: the duty of public
accommodations toward customers and the duty of medical providers toward
patients. My aim is not to defend the common law's treatment of public
accommodations, but rather to demonstrate that no single common law exists.
As Part I shows, common law duties of public accommodations are not static,
but rather responsive to societal values. Judicial interpretations of the duties of public
accommodations developed in conversation with regulatory and legislative efforts. 20
For much of U.S. history, businesses open to the public had a common law duty to
provide equal access to their facilities-a duty that statutes in many states rejected
and, eventually, partially restored. 21 And, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
courts regularly awarded dignitary damages for denial of equal treatment in public
accommodations under the common law, albeit under circumstances that few
22
modern courts would countenance.
Part II offers a second example that exposes the inutility of baselines built around
a pre-regulatory moment: the enactment of conscience legislation permitting
hospitals and individual providers to refuse to perform abortions for religious or
moral reasons. These statutes came into effect at a time when the common law duties
of doctors and hospitals were in the process of transformation. 23 These statutes
will not receive the benefit. But from the standpoint of the Millian Harm Principle, an exemption to such
regulation merely returns the parties to the position they occupied before law coercively intervened.").
17 See generallyEsbeck, supra note 13.
See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerisn, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015).
Often, proponents of the pre-regulatory baseline overlook existing regulations, subsidies, and statutes. For
example, regarding employer-based insurance, the Affordable Care Act did not create, whole-cloth, a
comprehensive regulatory structure, but rather amended the Employee Retirement Investment Security
Act ("ERISA"), see LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION
AND WELFARE BENEFITS 109-14 (3d ed. 2012), which has been amended at various times over the past
thirty years to add coverage mandates to employer-based insurance. Id. at 94-100, 105-09. Similarly, the
ACA's tax on employers offering inadequate insurance coverage-the so-called employer
mandate-properly might be understood, not as a "new" tax, but rather as a condition on receipt of the
substantial pre-existing tax subsidy for employer health insurance. Sepper, supra, at 1484-86.
1 The classic example of this phenomenon is products liability shifting from a contract theory of
breach of warranty to a negligence cause of action and then to strict liability and then largely back to
negligence again. See generally David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV.
LITIG. 955 (2007).
20 See infra Part I.
21 See infra Section
I.A.
22 See infra Section
I.B.
23 See infra Part
I.
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simultaneously upended longstanding duties, altered relations between hospitals and
doctors, and thwarted further evolution of common law. 24 So much was in flux that
any single common law is virtually impossible to identify and, in any event, proves
unhelpful to evaluate harms that these religious exemptions impose today.
Given the malleability of the common law, proponents of a pre-regulatory
baseline face a challenge. They must identify what they mean to be the common
law-or the law structuring private rights as opposed to government action. And
because the common law reflects judicial implementation of social norms and policy
choices, 25 they must then articulate the values behind that choice-just like those
scholars who propose a statutory baseline.
I. THE SHIFTING DUTIES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Much invocation of the common law baseline occurs in the context of religious
objections to public accommodations laws. In particular, hotels, wedding venues,
florists, photographers, bridal shops, and bakers have refused service to same-sex
couples. 26 Objectors to same-sex marriage and their defenders in the academy
frequently juxtapose antidiscrimination statutes with the common law freedom of
owners of private property to exclude anyone for any reason. 27 While inns and trains,
scholars say, had to serve all, exemptions from antidiscrimination law for other
businesses simply restore the status quo prior to a statute's enactment, inflicting no

24 See infra Part I.
25 Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968) ("The common law is not sterile

or rigid and serves the best interests of society by adapting standards of conduct and responsibility that
fairly meet the emerging and developing needs of our time."). Courts in the nineteenth century, for
example, undertook to shape the common law to promote industrialization and commercialization. See,
e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-27 (3d ed. 2005); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 67-108 (1977).
26 See, e.g., Elizabeth Daley, Illinois Hotel Fined Over $81,00 for Refusing Same-Sex Ceremony,

ADVOCATE (Mar. 30, 2016, 9:47 AM), https://www.advocate.com/marriage-equality/2016/3/30/illinoishotel-fined-over-81000-refusing-same-sex-ceremony

[https://perma.cc/EM7H-2KNU];

Gifford

v.

McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 14, 2016) (rejecting wedding venue's free exercise
objections to antidiscrimination law); State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 568 (Wash. 2017)
(concluding that applying antidiscrimination law to florist refusing to serve same-sex wedding does not

violate rights to free exercise); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013)
(holding

that photography company was

not entitled

to

free

exercise

exemption

from

public

accommodation law); Nina Terrero, NJ BridalShop Refused to Sell Wedding Dress to Lesbian Bride:

Owner Says: '7ats Illegal, "ABC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nj-bridal-shop-refusedsell-wedding-dress-lesbian/story?id=14342333#.UZqtN7Wkrlw
[https://perma.cc/B4CN-XZWM];
Katie
McDonough, Yet Another Bakery Refuses to Make Cake for Gay Wedding, SALON (May 15, 2013, 11:51
AM),
https://www.salon.com/2013/05/15/YetL another-bakery -refuses-cake-for gay-wedding/?utm-source-feedly

[https://perma.cc/X7GC-ZESA].
See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J. L.

&

27

GENDER 103, 131-32 (2015) ("Businesses' freedom to deal or not deal with others has given way to
increasingly wide-ranging public accommodations laws declaring discrimination in the provision of almost
any good or service to be a legal harm.").
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harm on same-sex couples or any other group.28
In particular, many proponents of a pre-regulatory baseline express skepticism of
dignitary damage from discrimination as third-party harm. As the story goes,
through increasing governmental regulation, "more injuries are transformed into
legally-and perhaps even constitutionally-cognizable rights" than existed at
common law. 29 Remedies for dignitary harms are "the most extreme example" of an
overreaching state.30
This Part argues that this framing of the baseline invokes a particular moment in
common law, not a universal standard. Obligations of public accommodations
differed across time periods and between jurisdictions. The law adapted to and
reflected the social, political, and moral commitments of its time. Statutes did not
intervene in a pre-regulatory space, but rather codified, abrogated, and amended
judge-made law.
A. From Duty to Serve to Right to Exclude
Over the course of U.S. history, public accommodation law repeatedly evolved to
meet emerging
needs and mold to societal mores.
For example,
inns-which proponents of the common law baseline tend to view as having had a
set duty of equal access under the common law-owed duties only to travelers until
the mid-nineteenth century. 3 ' Beginning with the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire's decision in Markham v. Brown in 1837,32 innkeeper obligations
"broadened to apply not just to travelers, but to the general public" in most
33
According to historian Alexander
jurisdictions within two decades.
Sandoval-Strausz, the social, ideological, and technological currents of
eighteenth-century society fueled this rapid movement in the common law of
innkeepers.34
More fundamentally, a pre-Civil War conception of businesses as common
callings" with a duty to serve the general public gave way to an idea of businesses as
private property with a right, and ultimately an obligation, to exclude unwanted
customers. Those shifts tracked the societal and legal entrenchment of racial
exclusion and segregation during the post-Reconstruction period.
As Joseph Singer has demonstrated meticulously and at length, the antebellum
common law rule dictated that businesses open to the public had a duty to serve

21 See Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in theMoralizedMarketplace,7 ALA. C.R. &C.L.L.
REV. 129, 14953 (2015) (reviewing the libertarian arguments in favor of exemptions from antidiscrimination law).
29 Marc 0. DeGirolami, Free Exercise byMoonight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 131 (2016).
30 See id. at 130.
31 A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, andfim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and

CivilRights in America, 23 LAw &HIST. REV. 53, 69-74 (2005).
32 Markham v. Brown, 8 N.H. 523, 530-31 (1837).
33 Sandoval-Strausz, supranote 31, at 69, 71-72.
34

Id. at 69-70, 73.
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people equally.35 While early treatises and cases often focused on innkeepers and
common carriers, the rule appears to have applied more broadly, to barber shops,
victuallers, bakers, tailors, and traders, indeed, "to all businesses that hold themselves
out as ready to serve the public."36 A business that met this definition could not
exclude customers without good cause,3 7 regardless of whether the customer could
find another business willing to serve him.38
For a brief period after the Civil War, it seemed that these rights of access would
extend to newly freed slaves. As Erwin Chemerinsky observes, "At the time the
fourteenth amendment was ratified, it still was believed that the common law
provided protection against private interference with individual rights[,]"39 and, in
1883, in deciding the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court assumed that
discrimination in public accommodations was prohibited by the common law.40
Between 1865 and 1873, eight states of the former Confederacy and three northern
states explicitly affirmed the duty of equal access by enacting public accommodation
laws. 4
Courts frequently took early antidiscrimination statutes to codify then-extant
common law. The Mississippi Supreme Court, for example, said that the common
law had "always" demanded that inns, common carriers, and "public shows and
amusements" be open to all "unless sufficient reason were shown."4 2 The public
accommodation law therefore "deal[t] with subjects which have always been under

35 See generallyJosephWilliam Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations andPrivate
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (reviewing American and English treatises, case law, and
custom).
36

37

Id. at 1327-31.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 475, at 413 (Edmund H.
Bennett trans., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 7th ed. 1863) (1856) (describing an inn subject to this rule
as "a common inn, or diversorium, that is, an inn kept for travellers [sic] generally (and not merely for a
short season of the year, and for select persons, who are lodgers)"); see also Chevallier v. Straham, 2 Tex.
115, 121 (1847) (contrasting a carrier "only employed, by a special contract, to transport goods for a
particular person" and carriers-though working as farmers most of the year-who "run their wagon
whenever they meet with an opportunity. . . . for such persons as see fit to employ them").
31 Phil Nichols, Note, Redefining "Common Carrier" The FCC's Attempt at Deregulation by
Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 501, 508 (1987) (discussing the common law development of a "widely
accepted" definition of common carriers by the mid-1800s that included the holding-out criteria, but did
not depend on "the market positions of individual common carriers"); Henry H. Perritt,Jr., TortLiability,
the FirstAmendment, and EqualAccess to ElectronicNetworks, 5 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 65, 77 (1992)
("Historically, one of the most important determinants of common carrier status was whether one held
oneself out as a common carrier.... A common carrier achieved certain benefits by holding itself out as an inn,
blacksmith (farrier), stage line, railroad, telephone company, or other similar business."); Singer, supra note 35,
at 1319 ("[T]he presence of competition was never a reason for denying the duty to serve. . . .").
39

Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 515 (1985).

SId. ([T]he wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private
wrong [subject to tort liability]." (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883))); id.
("Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the
extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation[s] to all unobjectionable persons who in good
faith apply for them." (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25)).
41 Singer, supranote 35, at 1374.
42

Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 680-81 (1873).
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legal control" and "in no sense appropriate[d] the private property" of a theater owner
who had been fined for excluding black patrons.43 Other state supreme courts agreed
that even in the absence of a statute, black people would have had common law rights
to equal treatment.44 And those courts upheld these public accommodations statutes
as applied to businesses beyond common carriers and inns.4 5
The waning of Reconstruction signaled contestation over, and constriction of,
the prior duty to serve. The courts played a significant role. For example, "[b]y the
1870s and 1880s, the law of common carriers had emerged as a crucial battleground
in the working out of the social, political, and economic order in the New South"
-as courts and litigants struggled with the role of race in a train system categorized
by gender and class.46 While for a period of time courts sided with black plaintiffs,
soon it became clear that common carriers would be authorized to segregate
passengers by race.47 Some courts then extended the prerogative more widely. For
example, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the ability of common carriers
to segregate passengers supported applying a similar rule to theaters, observing that

4

Id. at 681-82.

Decuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1, 5 (1875), ("In truth [sic] the right of the plaintiff to sue the
defendant for damages would be the same, whether [the act] existed or not[.]"), rev'd on other grounds

sub non. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718, 720 (Mich. 1890) ("The
common law as it existed in this state before the passage of this statute, and before the colored man became
a citizen under our constitution and laws, gave to the white man a remedy against any unjust
discrimination to the citizen in all public places.").
Some courts took later civil rights acts to similarly codify existing rights. See Orloff v. Los Angeles
Turf Club, Inc., 227 P.2d 440, 453 (Cal. 1951) ("The so-called civil rights statutes ... do not necessarily
grant theretofore non-existent rights or freedoms. The enactments are declaratory of existing equal rights
and provide the means for their preservation by placing restrictions upon the power of proprietors to deny
the exercise of the right and by providing penalties for violation."). But see Orloff 227 P.2d at 455
(Spence, J., concurring) ("[C]ontrary to the implications in the majority opinion, the source of plaintiffs
right . . . to be admitted to a place of public amusement rests solely in the statutes . . . . [N]o such right
existed at common-law."). Defending Title II of the Civil Rights Act, the federal public accommodation
provision, then Solicitor General Archibald Cox invoked "centuries" of "Anglo-American common law"
that required equal access from "innkeepers, hackmen, carriers, wharfage men, ferriers, all kinds of other
people holding themselves out to serve the public." Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-42, Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), in 60 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 541,541,582-83 (Philip
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
4

Sauvinet v. Walker, 27 La. Ann. 14, 14-15 (1875), affd, 92 U.S. 90, 90 (1875) (applying

Louisiana's constitutional and statutory public accommodation provisions, which applied to "all places of

business," to a keeper of a coffee house); People v. King, 18 N.E. 245, 248-49 (N.Y. 1888) (upholding
public accommodations law as applied to private skating-rink owner and rejecting attempted distinction
of the "business of an innkeeper or a common carrier").
46 Kenneth W. Mack, Law, Society, Identity, and the Making of the Jim Crow South: Travel and

Segregation on Tennessee Railroads, 1875-1905 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 377, 377-78 (1999).
47

MICHAELJ. KLARMAN, FROMJIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 89 (2004) ("Common-law challenges to racially unequal railroad
accommodations had frequently succeeded through the mid-1880s, but such cases virtually disappeared
thereafter.").
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"[w]hen colored persons attend theaters and other places of amusement conducted
and carried on by white persons, custom assigns to them separate seats."48
In other states, courts sided with black plaintiffs seeking equal access to train and
steamship facilities.49 Applying a statute that it viewed as codifying common law, the
Michigan Supreme Court rejected segregation in no uncertain terms:
The cases which permit in other states the separation of the African and
the white races in public places can only be justified on the principle that
God made a difference between them, which difference renders the
African inferior to the white[] .... This doctrine . . runs through and
taints justice in all these cases ... .0
Thus,
the
court concluded,
a restaurant
could
not
segregate
customers and live up to its duties under common law and statute." Judicial
interpretations-and reinterpretations-of the common law both reflected and
constituted postbellum society, with widely differing results between states. 52
As Reconstruction ended, legislatures intervened in these common law
conversations, rejecting the duty-to-serve rule. Initially, state laws across the South
gave businesses a right to exclude customers at will. 53 Whether one views such laws
as abrogating or codifying the common law depends crucially on the baseline (and
the jurisdiction). By 1900, however, that right to exclude had become a duty in every
state in the former Confederacy and in Kentucky, as statutes required segregation in
places of public accommodation. 54 Even as de jure segregation has faded away, the
no-duty-to-serve common law rule reflects a moment, not free of legislative
involvement, but very much affected by it.
In the fight to gain equal access to public accommodations, civil rights leaders of
the 1950s and 1960s explicitly sought-not to reject-but to reclaim the antebellum
view of common law rights of access. 5 5 And they succeeded, at least partially, through
4

1

49

Younger v. Judah, 19 S.W. 1109, 1111 (Mo. 1892).
See, e.g., Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185, 188 (1870); Coger v. N.W. Union

Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 152-53 (1873) (interpreting the common law to prohibit denial of first-class
ticket and meal to a black woman on a steamboat as it would for a white woman).

Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718, 720-21 (Mich. 1890).
s' Id. at 719-21.
52 A similar phenomenon existed with regard to statutory duties, as judicial decisions often narrowed
the kinds of businesses subject to a duty to serve. See, e.g., Bowlin v. Lyon, 25 N.W. 766 (Iowa 1885)
(exempting places of entertainment); Rhone v. Loomis, 77 N.W. 31 (Minn. 1898) (applying the same
exemption to saloons, despite law covering "places of... refreshment").
53

See, e.g., Act of Mar. 24, 1875, ch. 130, § 1, 1875 Tenn. Acts 216,216-17 ("[H]ereafter no keeper

.

of any hotel, or public house, or carrier of passengers for hire, or conductors, drivers, or employes [sic] of
such carrier or keeper, shall be bound, or under any obligation to entertain, carry or admit, any person,
whom he shall for any reason whatever, choose not to entertain, carry, or admit. .
54 Singer, supranote 35, at 1388.
5
" JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 81-87, 96-101 (1959); id. at 112
("There is no established way of legally getting at private action without a civil rights law-the various
common law rules have usually, as a practical matter, been nullified."); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 296-300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (reviewing history of common law duty to serve).
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the enactment of public accommodation law. In much of the country, to the extent
the common law ever permitted a right to exclude people on any basis, that right
terminated for most businesses half a century ago. 6 In a handful of other states, the
no-duty-to-serve common law rule, which "originated in an attempt to deny equal
rights to African-Americans," continues to permit discrimination in public places
based on the race, religion, sexual orientation, or any other characteristic of a
patron.57
B. DifferingDnitaryHarnsAcross Decades
Dignitary damages in public places provide a second example of the fluidity of
the common law. Contrary to proponents of the common law baseline, the common
law in its various manifestations through our history has not been indifferent
to damage to dignity. Numerous torts of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries-such as outrage and heart balm-aimed at remedying injury that was
primarily emotional, not physical.58 Of particular relevance, innkeepers, common
carriers, and other places open to the public could be held liable for inflicting insult,
humiliation, and distress on actual and would-be customers.5 9
Courts viewed the principal harm of denial of equal access as the insult to dignity.
In 1887, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court held that "[w]ounding a man's
feelings is as much actual damage as breaking his limbs."60 The public nature of the
affront distinguished the public accommodations context from others.' Courts
reasoned that humiliation damages were essential, because otherwise the plaintiff
would be allowed to recover mere contract damages-the cost of the ticket, for
example-damages that did not adequately reflect the injury.6 2 In 1912, the Alabama
Supreme Court observed:

5 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259-60 (1964) (noting that by the
year of the Civil Rights Act's passage, thirty-two states had public accommodation laws).
17 Singer, supranote 35, at 1448.
" See generally Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbancein the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); see alsoJohn E. Duda, Damages for Mental Suffering in Discrimination
Cases, 15 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 8 (1966) ("There is a class of conduct considered by society to
be so outrageous as to warrant an award for humiliation, indignity, and mental suffering when it is not
followed by physical injury[,]" including wrongful eviction and insult by public carriers and innkeepers).
5

See, e.g., Chicago, St. L. &P. R. Co. v. Holdridge, 20 N.E. 837, 839 (Ind. 1889) (compiling cases

allowing recovery for the "humiliation and degradation" of wrongful denial of carriage by a common
carrier); De Wolf v. Ford, 86 N.E. 527, 530 (N.Y. 1908) (noting that "the guest ... has affirmative rights
which the innkeeper is not at liberty to willfully ignore or violate," including a right not to be subjected to
insults or "distress of mind").
6o
61

Head v. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 7 S.E. 217,218 (Ga. 1887).
See, e.g., Aaron v. Ward, 96 N.E. 736, 738 (N.Y. 1911) ("[I]t is the publicity of the thing that

causes the humiliation.").
62 Chicago &Nw. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185, 190 (1870) (holding that where
a common carrier
inflicts delay, vexation, and indignity by excluding a passenger from the first-class car, the actual pecuniary
damages sustained "would, most often, be no compensation at all, above nominal damages, and no salutary
effect would be produced on the wrong doer by such a verdict").

2017--2018

Religious Exemptions, Harm to Others, and the Indeterminacy
of a Common Law Baseline

671

To prescribe the duty of protection from insults and indignities, and yet
hold the carrier immune to liability for the only consequence that can
ordinarily result therefrom, viz., mental suffering, would be simply a
contradiction in terms. That damages are recoverable in such cases,
without physical injury, is by no means a novel doctrine ...

..

The dignitary damages awarded were often substantial.64 For example, in 1938,
a fourteen-year-old girl received nearly $18,000 in today's dollars as a result of having
been refused admittance to a movie and accused, apparently incorrectly, of the
"indecent conduct" of previously "talking and giggling during the performances and
...

65
walking or running up and down the aisles."

Not only innkeepers and common carriers bore this duty. Similar liability was
imposed on theaters, amusement parks, resorts, restaurants, bathhouses, and other
places of amusement.66 At the turn of the twentieth century, one court summarized
its state's law, "[e]very person ... has a right to go to any public place, or visit a resort
where the public generally are invited" with "freedom from insult, personal
indignities, or acts which subject him to humiliation and disgrace ... ."67 In carrying
on business with the public generally, a proprietor assumed the duty to accord
"respectful and decent treatment" to customers." Some courts have ascribed this
"actionable form of emotional distress" against dignitary harms in public
accommodations to the special duties arising from the business relationship between
a public accommodation and its customers. 9
Public accommodation laws continue the tort law tradition.70 Hearing a case
under the state public accommodation statute, the 1921 Washington Supreme Court
63 Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Glenn, 60 So. 111, 112 (Ala. 1912); see also Missouri,
K.

&T. Ry. Co. v. Ball, 61 S.W 327, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) ("That damages for mental pain, anxiety,
distress, or humiliation suffered[] ... may be recovered, though unaccompanied with physical injury, pain,
or suffering, is now too well settled in this state to admit of question.").
64 Singer, supra note 35, at 1367 & 1377 (discussing "enormous sum" awarded in Brown v. Memphis

& C. R. Co., 7 F. 51, 68 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881) and large award in Houck v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 38 F.
226, 229-30 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1888)).
65 Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86, 87 (1938).
66 See, e.g., Saenger Theatres, 178 So. at 87-88 (discussing duties imposed on theaters);
Davis v.
Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 77 P. 209, 210-11 (Wash. 1904) (discussing duties imposed on amusement

parks and resorts); Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 126 N.E. 647, 648-49 (N.Y. 1920) (noting public
resorts bore duties toward patrons); Odom v. E. Ave. Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 312, 316 (1942) (observing that
that restaurants held such duties under common law; Aaron, 96 N.E. at 738 (holding that bathhouses
owed duties of equal access).
67 Dais, 77 P. at 211 (involving an amusement park employee who insulted a white plaintiffs
character, mistaking her for another woman).
6s Magruder, supra note 58, at 1051-52 (discussing claim for insult against retail store which was
rejected because the employee was acting outside of the scope of his employment).
69

Meyers v. Hot Bagels Factory, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1068, 1076-77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (noting that

&

the doctrine was recognized as early as 1911).
1o See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-306(7) (West 2017) (allowing damages for "an injury,
including humiliation and embarrassment, caused by .. . discriminat[ion]"); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck
Co., 731 P.2d 497, 501 (Wash. 1987) (noting that public accommodation law "seeks to remedy
nonphysical injuries, similar to dignitary torts").
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observed that racial discrimination by a movie theater "was a tort, and an action
founded thereon lies in tort."7 ' The theater argued that its policy of racial segregation
and denial of a floor seat to the plaintiff inflicted no personal injury and that recovery
was limited to breach of contract. 72 Drawing on common law cases going back to the
1890s, the court held:
[T]his is not the rule. The act alleged in itself carries with it the elements
of an assault upon the person, and in such cases the personal indignity
inflicted, the feeling of humiliation and disgrace engendered, and the
consequent mental suffering are elements of actual damages for which a
compensatory award may be made. This we have held since the early
history of the court."
While common law and statute remedied dignitary injury in public
accommodations, courts' appraisals of which dignitary affronts count as injury, of
course, have varied over time. Our society is not that of the nineteenth century. Today,
many courts would likely hesitate to uphold dignitary damages that a century ago seemed
self-evident in common law cases. 74 No contemporary court would award white plaintiffs
damages for the affront of being seated next to people of other races-as the common
law once allowed.75 Nor would the common law judge the dignitary harm inflicted by
disparagement by the standard of whether it is "offensive to ordinary female sensibilities,
or disrespectful to the female presence . . . ."'6 But, as society has come to recognize and
work to eradicate discrimination, courts in most states have come to permit recovery for
the damage of emotional distress from racial, ethnic, or religious abuse or
discrimination.7 7 The category of dignitary harm has not remained fixed.

" Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 194 P. 813, 816 (Wash. 1921).
72

id.

73 id.
74 Comparc Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 178 So. 86, 87-88 (Miss. 1938) (awarding a
fourteen-year-old girl $1,000 for "shame and humiliation" at a ticket-taker's denying her a seat and
accusing her of "indecent conduct as rendered her unfit and an improper character to enter the show ...
."), with White v. Walker, 950 F.2d 972, 978 (5th Cir. 1991) ("SaengerTheatres Corporationv. Herndon,
decided in 1938, . . . judged the outrageousness of the conduct at issue by standards now more than a
half-century out of date. We doubt that a contemporary court would impose liability for those actions.")
(footnote omitted).
7

SeeMissouri, K. &T. Ry. Co. v. Ball, 61 S.W 327, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) (authorizing a man

to recover such damages for discomfort and humiliation related to a train conductor's leaving his white
wife and their children in the car reserved for blacks).
76

Birmingham Ry., Light &Power Co. v. Glenn, 60 So. 111, 112 (Ala. 1912).

Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Recovery ofDamagesforEmotiona]DistressResultingfrom Racial,
Ethnic, orRehgious Abuse orDiscrimination,40 A.L.R.3d 1290, § 2[a] (2011) (originally published in
1971) (noting that a few states have rejected this majority rule).
7
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II. THE EVOLVING COMMON LAW AND MEDICAL CONSCIENCE LEGISLATION
To see how indeterminate a pre-regulatory baseline can be, consider legislation
that permits institutions and individuals to refuse to provide abortions, sterilizations,
or other medical care. The enactment of conscientious refusal legislation occurred
against a background of evolving common law. While the public accommodation
duties discussed in Part I were on-again-off-again, the common law related to
hospital and physician duties is significantly more complex. The short synopsis here,
therefore, is necessarily an illustrative, rather than complete, account of the common
law doctrines at play.
In 1972, a district court in Montana enjoined a Catholic hospital from refusing
tubal ligations to women following delivery of their babies on the ground that their
receipt of generous Hill-Burton funds created state action. Shortly thereafter, the
Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, recognizing a right to abortion." Congress
quickly responded, amending federal law to prohibit courts from finding that a
hospital receiving federal health funding acts under color of state law."' It further
passed the Church Amendment, a religious exemption that 1) made clear that receipt
of federal funds did not require an individual or institution to perform sterilizations
or abortions if it "would be contrary to ... religious beliefs or moral convictions";
and 2) required institutions to accommodate providers who refused to provide
sterilizations or abortions and to refrain from discriminating against providers who
perform such procedures outside the institutional facilities based on religious or
moral beliefs.8 2 State legislatures across the country followed suit.83 These laws
generally allowed refusal even where it would result in harm to women.
In one clear way, conscience legislation upended common law relations. Before
the Church Amendment, refusing physicians had no right to demand that a hospital
continue to keep them on staff even though they would not assist in abortions.84 The
Church Amendment and state laws granted new rights to providers to wield against

7s See Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, supra note 16, at
21-24 (employing the example of the "Church Amendment" as a lifting of a regulatory burden on religious
objectors that imposes no third-party harms). For a more comprehensive review of this legislation, see

Elizabeth Sepper, Taking ConscienceScriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1567-68 (2012).
7 Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948, 949-50, 950 n.1 (D. Mont. 1973).
s See generallyRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
s' See, e.g., Taylor, 369 F. Supp. at 950 (citing the law and its effect on the litigation).

32 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2012) (effective June 18, 1973).
See Sepper, supra note 78, at 1509-10 (reviewing contours of state law).
4 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Under Esbeck's framework, conscience legislation would
seem to be a religious preference that "confers on religion a naked advantage in private relations that it
would not have secured without legislative assistance," Carl H. Esbeck, 4hen Religious Exemptions
Cause Third-ParryHarms:Is the EstablishmentClause Violated?, 59 J. CHURCH & ST. 357, 364 (2016),
not a "true exemption" that lifts a "new" regulatory or tax burden imposed as part of comprehensive
lawmaking. Id. at 362. Under his analysis, the Church Amendment would seem then to fall within the
category of state action capable of imposing third-party harms.
13
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institutions. Under some state laws, these rights of the religious objector appear
unyielding."
With regard to the treatment of patients, the federal Church Amendment did
not change the ability of patients, injured by refusal of abortion or sterilization, to
pursue tort remedies-a traditional purview of state law. But state conscience
legislation did just that. It immunized refusing institutions and individuals from civil
and criminal liability. Patients harmed by refusal no longer had no recourse to courts
for common law claims related to medical malpractice or abandonment."
The common law standards applicable to patient care in 1973 were complex and,
in some ways, in flux. Individual doctors had no duty to treat or even examine
patients seeking care-a rule that continues today. 7 Nor did physicians have any
duty to perform abortions or sterilizations under the common law, a rule that Roe v.
Wade did not alter. But having undertaken to treat a patient, a physician had
longstanding common law duties to treat the patient in accordance with the standard
of care and not to abandon her."
In some places and situations, hospitals did have obligations to treat patients
(they also had duties to avoid negligence toward and abandonment of patients). By
the early 1970s, a limited duty of hospitals to treat patients in emergencies was slowly
beginning to emerge. The century-old no-duty-to-treat rule" was softening at least
in some states by the 1960s and into the 1970s. The first step in this direction was
taken in 1961 when, relying on principles of detrimental reliance, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that hospitals that maintained an emergency room open to the
public had a duty to treat "unmistakable emergenc[ies]."" In a common law "trend"
that continued into the 1970s," a minority of courts began to require hospitals to
treat patients in emergencies.92 Even in states that did not impose a duty to treat,
" See, e.g., Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702, 709-10 (Mont. 1979) (determining
that the healthcare provider's right to refuse is unqualified and does not require weighing interests of the
employer).
s6 See Sepper, supra note 78, at 1509-10.
1 See Kayhan Parsi, Duty to Treat ConscienceandPluralism,9 VIRTUAL MENTOR: AMAJ. ETHICS

362,362-64 (2007), http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2007/05/pdf/hlawl-0705.pdf [https://perma.cc/34LGYW8A].
ss61 Am. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc.
8

§

121 & nn.5-7 (2018).

See, e.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 138-39 (Del. 1961) (highlighting

cases applying the rule that hospitals owed no duty to treat); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058
(Ind. 1901) (finding that a medical license did not require the licensee to respond to a patient call even if
he was the only physician available).
9

Mianlove, 174 A.2d at

139-40.

Campbell v. Mincey, 413 F. Supp. 16,20 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (recognizing this "trend," but rejecting
it on the facts of the case).
92 For courts adopting the Manlove duty to treat rule, see Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found. Corp., 566

S.W.2d 791, 793-94 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Mo. 1969); Valdez
v. Lyman-Roberts Hosp., Inc. 638 S.W.2d 111, 115-16 (Tex. App. 1982); Mercy Med. Ctr. v.
Winnebago Cty., 206 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Wis. 1973). For a different approach, see Guerrero v. Copper
Queen Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1975) (en banc) (finding a duty to provide emergency care
based on public policy manifested in state licensing regulations and statutes requiring hospitals to maintain
an emergency room).
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courts sometimes held actionable a hospital's disregard of a patient with an
emergency condition within the emergency department.93 During the same time
period, other courts held that, under certain circumstances, some hospitals open to
the public acted under color of state law-due to their extensive government
financing and the public's reliance on them-and had to respect constitutional rights,
including a woman's right to abortion.9
Before the enactment of conscience laws, patients harmed by a physician's or
institution's failure to provide an abortion or sterilization would have had civil or
criminal recourse." In some states and situations, they could have based their claims
on a hospital's duty to treat. After the state conscience laws went into effect, a
woman injured, for example, by refusal to provide a D&C 6 in an emergency situation
could not bring a common law right of action against the doctors or hospital for
abandoning her, failing to live up to the standard of care, or refusing to treat. In this
sense, state conscience laws abrogated common law duties of non-abandonment and
compliance with the standard of care. They reversed course on hospitals' duty to treat
in the context of abortion and sometimes sterilization.
Now, the choice of the pre-regulatory moment is contestable. One might look
not to 1972 but back further to charitable immunity to set a baseline for analysis of
third-party harms. Under the common law doctrine of charitable immunity, courts
"assumed that charitable hospitals served the general good" and were properly
excused from liability for negligent acts of their agents. 7 This outcome manifested a
theory of justice according to which "protecting charitable activity, charities, and
donors was more important than satisfying judgments."" Beginning in the 1940s,
however, the common law rules related to charitable immunity began to be pared

9 See, e.g., New Biloxi Hosp., Inc. v. Frazier, 146 So. 2d 882, 887 (Miss. 1962). Courts also found
that a hospital, by initiating some treatment, created a sufficient hospital-patient relationship and,
therefore, had a duty to provide care. See Citizens Hosp. Ass'n. v. Schoulin, 262 So. 2d 303, 309 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1972); Bourgeois v. Dade Cty., 99 So. 2d 575, 576-78 (Fla. 1957); Methodist Hosp. v. Ball,
362 S.W.2d 475, 487-89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).
94 See, e.g., Duffield v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 503 F.2d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 1974); Simkins
v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 965-70 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
Several states today continue to treat private hospitals as quasi-public. Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal.
for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 970-72 (Alaska 1997) (treating private hospital as quasi-public for purposes of

providing abortions); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 366 A.2d 641, 645-47 (NJ. 1976) (concluding that
the state's conscience clause could not extend to private, nonsectarian hospitals because the hospitals were
quasi-public institutions with obligations to serve the public).
9 See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Not Only the Doctor's Dilemma: The Complexity of Conscience in
Medicine, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 385, 401-03 (2013) (describing the effects of state conscience laws).
96 Dilation and Curettage or "D&C" is a medical procedure that removes tissue from inside the uterus
to treat certain uterine conditions or to clear the uterine lining after a miscarriage or abortion. Dilation
and Curettage (D&C), Mayo Clinic (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.mayoclinic.org/testsprocedures/dilation-and-curettage/about/pac-20384910 [https://perma.cc/4T8R-58NR].
97 See ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 41 (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999) (1989).
9
Jill R. Horwitz, The Multiple Common Law Roots of CharitableImmunity: An Essayin Honor
ofRichardEpstein's Contributionsto TortLaw Scholarship, 3 J. TORT L., no. 1, 2010, at ii, 35.
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back." Courts took notice that nonprofit hospitals had evolved, growing in size and
economic power and engaging in sale of goods and services for revenue. Courts
embraced the corrective justice rationale of tort law, reasoning that victims should
not bear the costs of tortious acts; with the widespread availability of insurance,
nonprofits, like other entities, could insure against loss.' 00 While the legal rules
continued to vary between jurisdictions, the law in most states had moved away from
charitable immunity, abandoning it wholesale by the early 1980s.' 0
Perhaps, one might say, patients are only restored to this common law baseline
where charitable immunity limited suit against hospitals. But, even assuming that
was right, in many jurisdictions, courts took charitable immunity to apply only to
nonpaying patients,' 02 which might lead to the conclusion that only paying patients
are harmed by religious exemption. And, for all patients, individual doctors were
never protected from liability under the doctrine.
To the extent that it is relevant, the common law also continued to evolve after
1973. Until the late twentieth century, physicians were generally shielded from
liability by judicial deference to professional judgment and the locality rule which
would have required their local peers to be willing to testify against them.'03 Whereas
at the turn of the century consent was assumed as long as a patient did not object to
the physician's judgment, the 1970s saw the development of the doctrine of informed
consent, which affirmed the primacy of patient autonomy over medical
decision-making in jurisdictions across the United States.' 04 In rendering decisions,
courts reflected a "more egalitarian approach" to legal accountability for injury.10
The no-duty-to-treat rule also was rejected as inconsistent with societal values when
Congress recognized a limited duty to treat in emergencies through the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act in the mid-1980s.'o6 While granting patients
greater protections, Congress arguably stalled the further development of a state
common law duty to treat.
So, did the Church Amendment and like state statutes impose constitutionally
relevant harm at the moment of its enactment? What regulation-free moment
should we look to? If we use the state action framework employed by some
proponents of the common law baseline, was there no state action when the common
law imposed a duty to treat-and did the government then act by exempting
objectors? Regardless of one's answer to these questions, distinctions based on

9 Victor E. Schwartz et al., TowardNeutralPrinciplesofStare Decisis in TortLaw, 58 S.C. L. REV.
317, 354-55 (2006).
o Id. at 354-55.
101 Id. at 355 & n.242.
102 See, e.g., CharitableImmunity, 7 CATH. LAW. 78, 78-79, 79 n.17 (1961).
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common law versus statute or state action versus inaction prove unhelpful to identify
a determinate baseline for analyzing the harms that conscience legislation might
impose. 0 7 To be sure, conscience exemptions can be seen to revert to a previous
moment in time, but not to a single, unitary common law or, in those states with a
duty to treat, even to the common law prior to exemption.
Moreover, looking to the day before conscience legislation was enacted does not
capture the burdens the legislation imposes on third parties today. In 1973,
congressional concerns about the Church Amendment's potential impact on
women's-in particular poor women's-access to abortion were assuaged based on
reasonable assurances about background norms that do not exist today. At the time,
everyone assumed the existence of many public hospitals, presumably subject to a
duty
to
treat. 08
The
era's
politics
bore
little
resemblance
to
ours-more Republicans than Democrats supported legal abortion, and abortion was
viewed as a Catholic issue.o' Today, none of these assumptions holds.
As Professor Marshall intimated in his symposium contribution, the burdens of
exemption may shift over time in light of background norms, laws, and practices." 0
Longstanding exemptions might reveal themselves to be newly burdensome and
perhaps unconstitutional."' Or exemptions once burdensome might become light.
In other words, the baseline changes. What makes rights valuable or immaterial and
exemptions burdensome or insignificant shifts over time and place.
CONCLUSION

A common law baseline suffers from far greater indeterminacy than a baseline
defined by statute or regulation. The common law functions as a vehicle for
ideological, technological, and societal change. Through a series of typically gradual
steps, courts have reinterpreted and revised the law to adapt to the politics, culture,
and values of their time. No single common law exists across states and throughout
history.
When courts or scholars advocate for a common law baseline, they choose to
revert to a particular time and place. This choice is not neutral, but as partial or
value-laden as the choice of a statutory baseline.

1o7 See Nelson Tebbe,
Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, When Do Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN
RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY (Susanna Mancini &Michel Rosenfeld eds.) (forthcoming May 2018)
(manuscript at 6-7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2812121 [https://perma.cc/E37VMJMF] (follow "Open PDF in Browser" hyperlink); id at 7 ("Why state action that establishes common
law rights is different from state action that creates statutory rights, however, is unclear. Common law
rights are not unchanging, fixed background points of reference .... ).
10s See Sara Dubow, "A ConstitutionalRightRenderedUtterlyMeaningless" Religious Exemptions

and ReproductivePolitics, 1973-2014, 27 J. POL'Y HIST. 1, 11-18 (2015).
109 Id. at 4.

.. William Marshall, Third-PartyBurdensand ConscientiousObjection to War, 106 KY. LJ. 685 (2018).
ill id.
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Ultimately, the notion of a pre-regulatory moment must be discarded if we are
to ascend from "baseline hell."" 2 Scholars skeptical of statutory harm must specify
what they take to be the common law or the legal framework of a "pre-regulatory"
moment. More fundamentally, given the absence of a neutral baseline to tell us which
harms count, they must construct a theory of justice underlying their choice of
baseline." 3 The invocation of the common law, any more than reference to statutory
rights, is not talismanic.

.

112 See Rick Hills, Baseline Hell and the Religion Clauses, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 20, 2016, 3:57
AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/08/20/
[https://perma.cc/VV6PAV5Y]('"[B]aseline hell' refers to the futility of arguing about whether some burden is the imposition of
a 'penalty' or the withholding of a special 'benefit' in the absence of a theory of distributive justice.").
113 Some scholars have begun to make admirable strides to construct such baselines, albeit in often
diverging ways. See, e.g., NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 60 (2017)
('We should determine whether others have been harmed by taking into account all the values at play.
. . This normative inquiry may be complicated, but the alternatives are unworkable."); see also Tebbe,
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 107 (manuscript at 5-7); Kathleen A. Brady, Religious
Accommodations and Third-PartyHarms: ConstitutionalValues andLimits, 106 KY. LJ. 717, 748-49

(2018).

